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This study investigated age differences in generalization of causal value employing 
similarity as a cue to causality. Exemplars from six food categories (A+, B-, C+, D-. E+, 
F-) were presented to both young and older adults in two contiguous training phases. 
Training Phase 1 included exemplars from categories A+, B-, C+, D-. Training Phase 2 
included exemplars from A+, B-, E+, F-. Foods in the “+” categories were paired with an 
outcome of sickness and foods in the “-” categories were not paired with sickness. Tests 
of causal judgment and exemplar recognition were conducted. For causal judgment, 
individual exemplars experienced during training and novel exemplars from all six 
categories were presented. For categories A+ and B-, the categories experienced in both 
training phases, young and older groups generalized the causal value to the category label 
and to all exemplars regardless of whether they were experienced in training or were 
novel. For categories experienced only once in training (C+, D-, E+, F-), both groups 
were better able to successfully judge causal value for experienced exemplars than novel 
exemplars. For young and older adults, experience made a difference in the ability to 
generalize causal value. Experienced and novel exemplars were also presented for 
recognition. Participants in both age groups showed a false memory effect for individual 
exemplars from the more experienced categories (A+, B-) suggesting that the process that 
allowed them to generalize causal value also interfered with their memory for individual 
exemplars. There was a difference between the younger and older groups for the 
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categories that were only experienced once in training (C+, D-, E+, F-). In this case, 
younger participants showed better recognition than older adults for the individual 
exemplars. Older adults showed the same false memory effects for these categories as 
they showed for categories A+ and B-. These findings suggest that older adults generalize 
causal value as well as younger adults, but they are less able to distinguish individual 
exemplars. This discrepancy may be explained by differences in ability to use verbatim 
and gist. Older adults’ reduced verbatim processing leads to default gist encoding that 
enables them to focus on category level features but not process detailed exemplar 
identity (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990). Younger adults appear to have a flexibility that 
enables them to encode and retrieve both category-level gist and verbatim individual 
exemplar features when the task calls for it. 
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CHAPTER 1 
                Literature Review    
Understanding causal relationships is imperative to humans. The ability to 
determine causality imbues the world with predictability and order. The desire to make 
sense of our world by examining causal influences is demonstrated, not only by the 
efforts of philosophers, mathematicians, and scientists, but by all humans. Although 
causal influence can only be observed indirectly, we determine cause and form causal 
beliefs from the patterns we perceive in the world. Determination of cause is so 
fundamental and pervasive that humans possess a mental system of inference with the 
propensity to generate a cause even when one is not perceived through the senses 
(Newberg & d’Aquili, 2000). This inferential system uses mental processes to group or 
associate ideas and representations of events and objects. English and Scottish 
philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries identified contingency, 
contiguity, and similarity as the basic laws of association (Hume, 1739/1969). These 
concepts form the basis of modern theories of learning and memory. How we employ the 
associative learning tools of contingency, contiguity, similarity to infer causality is a 
persistent and pervasive question. Additionally, the developmental and mental factors 
that affect the perception of causality and lead to veridical causal judgment are of interest 
in contemporary psychological study.  
Associative Processes in Young and Older Adults’ Causal Learning 
Theories of associative learning accept contingency, contiguity, and similarity as 
fundamental to causal learning.  Contingency, the frequency and consistency with which 
potential causes (cues) occur contiguously with an effect (outcome), can be expressed as 
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a 2 X 2 contingency table (see Figure 1). Cell A represents the frequency with which both 
the cue and outcome occur (C O). Cell B represents the frequency with which the cue 
occurs but the outcome does not occur (C ~O). Cell C represents the frequency with 
which the cue does not occur, yet the outcome occurs (~C O). Cell D represents the 
frequency with which neither the cue nor the outcome occurs (~C ~O). If, in real life 
experience or over a set of experimental trials, it is more probable that the outcome 
occurs in the presence of the cue [P(O|C)] than in the absence of the cue [P(O|~C)], the 
contingency is positive. If the probability is greater that the outcome occurs in the 
absence of the cue [P(O|~C)] than in the presence of the cue [P(O|C)], the contingency is 
negative. There is a non-contingent relationship between cue and outcome if the 
probability of the outcome occurring in the presence of the cue equals the probability of 
the outcome occurring in the absence of a cue [P(O|C)] = [P(O|~C)]. 
 
Figure 1. Example of a 2 x 2 contingency table. 
Young adults are quite proficient at assessing these contingent probabilities and at 
using contingency to make causal judgments (Mutter & Plumlee, 2009; Mutter & 
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Williams, 2004). However, there is a growing body of evidence that supports an age-
related decline in older adults’ ability to successfully judge causal contingency (Mutter, 
Haggbloom, Plumlee, & Schirmer, 2006; Mutter, Strain, & Plumlee, 2007; Mutter & 
Williams, 2004). In a set of four experiments, Mutter and Williams (2004) varied the 
contingency between pressing the computer spacebar and the appearance of a triangle on 
the monitor screen and found that older adults were not able to detect these contingencies 
as well as younger adults. For Mutter and Williams’ causal learning task, bar-pressing 
was either generatively linked to the appearance of the triangle (positive contingency) or 
withholding bar-pressing was preventatively linked to the appearance of the triangle 
(negative contingency) Age differences were significantly more pronounced for negative 
than positive contingencies. Whereas younger adults were able to estimate both positive 
and negative contingencies, older adults were unable to distinguish negative 
contingencies from non-contingent events. 
When contingency evidence is acquired through description as opposed to direct 
experience (i.e. bar-pressing), age differences in causal contingency judgment remain. 
Mutter and Plumlee (2009) presented written causal judgment problem descriptions based 
on nature, social interactions, and abstract scenarios. They found that when evidence was 
provided in descriptive form, older adults judged positive (generative) contingencies as 
successfully as younger adults. However, when the relationship between cue and 
outcome was negative (preventative contingency) older adults were significantly less 
accurate. Older adults appeared to pay attention only to the information in Cell A (C O). 
Employing this Cell-A rule, they ignored cells that require taking absent information into 
consideration. This is further evidence that the observed deficit in older adults’ 
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contingency learning may be related to an inability to successfully estimate the frequency 
for the contingencies in which the absence of a cue results in an outcome (Mutter, 
DeCaro, & Plumlee, 2009: Mutter et al., 2006; Mutter et al., 2007; Mutter & Plumlee, 
2009; Mutter & Williams, 2004) 
Contiguity, an additional cue to causality, describes the proximal relationship 
between a cause and effect. Although prior experience can influence expectation and 
subsequent determination of cause, in general the timing or physical location of a 
potential cause and a perceived effect must be contiguous (Allan, Tangen, Wood, & 
Shah, 2003). When cue and outcome are not contiguous, causal ratings for events 
converge toward zero (Mutter et al., 2009). When a cue and outcome are contiguous, 
young adults accurately assess causal relationships, but the accuracy of their causal 
judgment declines as the time between a cue and outcome increases. For example, an 
inter-stimulus interval of 2 seconds reduces young adults’ causal judgment and an 
interval of 4 seconds eliminates it (Shanks & Dickinson, 1991; Shanks, Pearson, & 
Dickinson, 1989).  
Younger adults can use temporal contiguity to help learn a causal relationship 
whether that relationship is generative (an action causes a result) or preventative (the 
absence of an action causes a result). Older adults, on the other hand, can use temporal 
contiguity to help learn a generative causal relationship but have difficulty learning the 
same relationship when the cause is preventative (Mutter et al., 2009). Mutter et al. 
presented younger and older adults with a problem in which they were to judge the causal 
relationship between pressing the computer spacebar (cue) and the appearance of a 
triangle on the computer screen (outcome). In two experiments, the temporal continuity 
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varied between 4000 ms and 50 ms. Younger and older adults judged the causal 
relationship between the instrumental response and outcome to be stronger when they 
were immediately contiguous than when there was a delay. Both groups were able to use 
contiguity as a cue to causality when the cause was generative, both groups showed 
sensitivity to the difference in contingency for generative causes, and both groups 
expressed stronger causal judgment for the more contiguous outcome. However, there 
was a difference in the two groups’ ability to use contiguity to assess causal relationships 
when the cause was preventative. When the appearance of the triangle was contingent on 
the participant not pressing the spacebar, the degree of contiguity had no effect on older 
adults’ judgments (Mutter et al., 2009). Thus, unlike younger adults, older adults were 
unable to use temporal contiguity as a cue to causal relationships when the cause was 
preventative.  
In summary, older adults appear to have a deficit in using contingency and 
contiguity as cues to causality when there is a negative contingency or preventative 
relationship between a cue and outcome whether the information is provided through 
description or experience. It appears that older adults have more trouble than young 
adults making accurate causal judgments when a cue or outcome is absent. When it is the 
absence of a response that leads to outcome, not even strong contiguity helps older adults 
learn causal relationships.  
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Aging and Causal Learning for Absent Cues 
In any causal learning situation, there are an infinite number of cues that are 
absent and completely irrelevant. There may also be absent cues that are perfectly 
causally relevant – the true cause of the outcome or effect. According to Hearst (1991), 
absent cues include physical cues that are expected but have been deleted or fail to occur. 
In addition, absent cues include cognitive representations of events or objects that must 
be retrieved from memory, those that are imperceptible, and those that must be imagined 
because we were absent in their presence. Hearst points out that humans (as well as other 
species) process objects and events that are currently present differently from those that 
are currently absent. Joint occurrences of cue and outcome are given more credence than 
occurrences where a cue is not presented with the outcome and the addition of a cue is 
perceived more readily than the deletion of the same cue. This tendency to focus on 
present versus absent stimuli also leads to a phenomenon in learning known as the 
“feature positive effect” where the presence of a cue as a predictor is learned more 
successfully than the absence of a cue (Jenkins & Sainsbury, 1970).  For instance, 
pigeons more readily learn that the presence of a dot on a keylight (feature positive) 
predicts food than they learn that an absence of a dot on a keylight (feature negative) 
predicts this outcome.  
Humans also show the feature-positive effect. In order to examine age differences 
for this phenomenon, Mutter et al. (2006) compared older adults’ and younger adults’ 
performance in feature-positive and feature-negative discrimination learning tasks. This 
task used geometric figures as the feature. The presence of a triangle, for example, 
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constituted the correct response in a feature-positive discrimination. The absence of a 
triangle constituted the correct response in a feature-negative discrimination. As 
expected, both younger and older participants learned the feature-positive discrimination 
faster than the feature-negative discrimination, demonstrating the feature-positive effect 
in their causal learning. However, younger adults learned more quickly than older adults. 
Subsequently, participants were required to transfer their knowledge of the feature-
positive or feature-negative rule to a new discrimination problem. Following initial 
feature-positive training, younger adults’ transfer performance on both feature positive 
and feature negative tasks improved. Younger adults were also able to transfer 
knowledge gained in feature-negative training to new feature-positive problems as well 
as new feature-negative problems. Older adults were able to transfer knowledge gained in 
feature-positive training to a new feature-positive task, but, unlike younger adults, they 
were unable to transfer knowledge from a feature-negative task to a new problem (Mutter 
et al., 2006).  
An experimental addition made the Mutter et al. (2006) results even more 
elucidating. They used a third group composed of young adults who were distracted by 
number memorization during the learning tasks. The distracted young participants 
performed as if they were older. These findings suggest that working memory capacity is 
an important factor in the processing of absent cues. The demands of retrieving and 
representing an absent cue, maintaining that representation, and manipulating it may 
exceed capacity in individuals with reduced working memory. The difficulty observed in 
older adults causal learning for negative or preventative cue-outcome relationships may 
be due to the additional resources required to process absent cues.  
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Absent cues also make association-based causal judgment difficult. Retrospective 
revaluation is a paradigm that allows for the investigation of causal learning about 
association-based absent cues. The two most frequently encountered and tested 
retrospective revaluation effects are recovery from overshadowing and backward 
blocking. Recovery from overshadowing, described by Kaufman and Bolles, (as cited in 
Dickinson & Burke, 1996) occurs when new causal information about a presented cue 
leads to an increase in the causal value of an associated absent cue. For example, if rice 
and beans are eaten together and cause an allergic reaction (AB+) and subsequently beans 
are eaten alone and do not cause an allergic reaction (B-), the causal value of rice (A) will 
increase. Backward blocking is the second scenario. For example, if shrimp and grits 
(CD+) are eaten together and cause an allergic reaction and subsequently grits (D+) are 
eaten alone and cause an allergic reaction, the causal value of shrimp (C) will decrease.  
Both retrospective revaluation effects have been produced in human participants 
using an allergy-prediction scenario (Dickinson & Burke, 1996; Mutter, Atchley, & 
Plumlee, in press). Younger adults consistently revalue absent cues when new 
information about presented cues demands it (Dickinson & Burke, 1996; Mutter et al., in 
press). However older adults show a deficit in their ability to revalue absent cues. Mutter 
et al. conducted a series of four experiments using the allergy prediction paradigm to 
evaluate older adults’ recovery from overshadowing. Additionally, their experiment 
investigated the effects of providing working memory support on the ability of older 
adults to learn causal relationships for absent cues. In Experiment 1, when first presented 
with unrelated food pairs resulting in allergic reaction (AB+) and subsequently presented 
with information that food B did not cause the allergic reaction (B-), older adults showed 
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no ability to revalue the absent cue A. For Experiment 2, food pairs were constructed that 
“went together” (steak and potatoes). Presumably, a food that is already associated with 
another would be more likely to cue that food in its absence and this previous and strong 
association would reduce the working memory load for older adults. Despite having the 
support of previously associated pairs, older adults still did not retrospectively revalue the 
causal value of the absent cue. For Experiment 3, more training trials were added to 
ensure that the differences were not due to a need for additional learning experience in 
the older group. The results did not differ from Experiment 2. Finally, in Experiment 4 
the “absent” cue was presented as a non-salient (grey-toned and reduced size) icon. With 
this manipulation, older adults did show retrospective revaluation of the “absent” cue. 
Mutter et al. (in press) suggest that age-related deficits in preventative causal learning and 
retrospective revaluation may result from older adults attenuated ability to successfully 
bind, or associate, the cues together. The presentation of one cue does not activate the 
representation of the absent cue. But when the “absent” cue was present as a non-salient 
reminder, older adults were able to revalue its causal value.  
Current Study 
The findings from these studies show that older adults’ causal learning, like that 
of young adults, is sensitive to variations in contingency and contiguity when cues are 
present in the environment. In addition, older adults are able to assess and revalue the 
causal value of present cues. However, it appears that older adults are particularly 
insensitive to contingency and contiguity when the absence of a cue predicts an event and 
they are less able to assess and change the causal value of absent cues. Because older 
adults have this particular deficit in causal learning, an pertinent question is whether they 
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can use another law of association, similarity, to successfully make causal judgments 
about absent cues. There has been no direct research on this question.   
Similarity, like contingency and contiguity, can be a basis for successfully 
determining causal relationships. Although similarity is not completely synonymous with 
categorization, similarity is accepted by many theorists as one basis for category 
formation (Goldstone, 1994). Categorization allows for processing the most information 
with the least possible cognitive effort and greatly simplifies the overwhelming task of 
organizing the infinite number of possible stimuli into more easily understandable 
groupings (Rosch, 2002). Humans, without conscious effort and beginning at a very early 
age, assign objects and events to categories (Cohen, 2003). The individual members of a 
category, although distinguishable, are treated as equivalent. This stimulus equivalence 
extends to causal judgment. Cause is a central feature in determining category 
membership (Ahn, Kim, Lassaline, & Dennis, 2000). Thus, when one member of a 
category is an assumed cause of an effect, causal value will generalize to the other 
members as a result of their similarity to the causal cue (Mervis & Rosch, 1981).  
Although similarity is understood to be a cue to causality, little research has been 
done on the use of stimulus equivalence in the generalization of causal value. However, a 
recent study by Griffiths & Mitchell (2008) addresses this issue. They investigated the 
causal judgment of younger adults using a typical human causal learning task that 
employed exemplars from food categories. Exemplars from some categories consistently 
caused illness and exemplars from other categories consistently caused no illness. For 
each exemplar, participants predicted the outcome and then received feedback as to 
whether or not it caused illness. Participants were expected to use category membership 
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and generalization to generate and mentally represent the absent food category from the 
presented exemplars. They were then expected to use similarity to predict the causal 
value of new exemplars from those categories at test. Griffiths and Mitchell’s young 
adults learned to discriminate the categories that caused illness from those that did not 
and they were able to generalize causal value from the presented exemplars to the 
category. Furthermore, they used similarity, as defined by category membership as a cue 
to causality for new exemplars. When tested for individual exemplar recognition, 
participants recognized significantly fewer exemplars from categories with which they 
had had the most experience (seen the most individual exemplars). The more successfully 
that causal value was generalized to the category, the poorer the recognition for the 
individual category members. 
In the current study, Griffith and Mitchell’s (2008) procedure was used to 
determine whether older adults can use similarity to generalize causal value to the absent 
cue category and to novel category exemplars. Although older adults have a deficit using 
contingency or contiguity in causal learning for absent cues, evidence from research on 
aging and semantic priming suggests that they may be able to successfully use similarity 
to generalize causal value to absent cues.  For example, in a study on aging and category 
priming, Light and Albertson (1989) presented young and older participants with 50-
word study lists composed of three category members from each of six different 
categories and 32 non-related filler words. Participants were asked to rate the meaning of 
each word as pleasant or unpleasant. After a delay period, participants were then given 
six category labels and asked to generate eight exemplars for each category. Exemplars of 
three of the categories had been encountered within the study list and three were 
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unstudied categories. After this task, a cued recall test was administered. Younger and 
older adults were equally likely to provide the exemplars that they had seen on the study 
list when asked to generate exemplars. This category priming occurred despite the fact 
that the exemplars used were not the most frequently named exemplars of the categories.  
For cued recall, the results were different. Younger adults were more successful in 
explicitly remembering the individual items encountered in the study lists.  
Young and older adults also perform similarly on a semantic priming task using 
category exemplars (Burke, Diaz, & White, 1987). Semantic priming is typically assessed by 
presenting a prime word and measuring the speed with which a participant can make a lexical 
decision about subsequently presented targets. Target words that are associated with the 
prime are recognized faster than non-related words. If the word “doctor” is the prime, the 
subsequent target word “nurse” will be recognized more quickly as a word than “daisy”. 
Burke et al. (1987) compared younger and older adults’ priming performance in a task where 
participants were given two category names (tree, vegetable) and were asked to make lexical 
decisions about subsequently presented targets. The category prime was a clue to what the 
target category would be if the target was indeed a word. Targets consisted of non-word and 
word exemplars from either the primed category or another category. Some categories 
predicted target exemplars from that category (tree-ELM). Some categories predicted target 
exemplars from another category. For example, the category vegetable might predict 
exemplars from the category animal (vegetable-DOG). Although younger adults had faster 
response times than older adults in lexical decision, the older adults showed an undiminished 
level of priming. In addition to this evidence that older adults consistently and robustly show 
priming at a level equal to younger adults, Myerson, Ferraro, Hale, and Lima (1992) found 
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that older adults produce slightly stronger priming effects than younger adults. Although 
these differences are not significant in individual studies, Myerson et al.’s meta-analysis 
revealed a priming advantage for older adults. Burke et al. also found that both younger and 
older adults showed priming to category members that were uncommon and thus weakly 
related exemplars for the given categories. However, older adults showed significantly 
poorer results than younger participants when they were asked to recall the categories and 
words presented (Burke et al., 1987).  
Finally, there is no difference between younger and older adults performance on the 
Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure (Norman & Schacter, 1997; Tun, Wingfield, 
Rosen, & Blanchard, 1998). In the DRM procedure a list of related words is presented and 
memory for the list is assessed. All the individual list words converge semantically on a non-
presented critical lure. For example, thread, pin, sewing, sharp, point, pricked, thimble, 
haystack, pain, hurt, and injection all converge on the non-presented critical word needle.  
When memory for the list is assessed, the non-presented critical lure is “remembered” as 
often as words actually presented in the middle of the cue series. Using the DRM procedure, 
researchers have shown that false memory for strongly associated non-presented cues occurs 
at about the same rate in older adults as in young adults (Norman & Schacter, 1997; Tun et 
al., 1998). The Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure is similar to the procedure 
employed by Griffiths and Mitchell (2008) to generate a food category name by presenting 
strongly associated exemplars.  Specifically, the non-presented critical lure in DRM is 
associated with each of the words on the presented list and is automatically activated. In the 
same way, each member of a category automatically activates the associated category name. 
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The absent critical lure in DRM and the absent category names are both semantically 
associated with presented words and become activated even in their absence.   
Older adults have a deficit in the ability to use absent cues when making causal 
judgments (Mutter et al., in press; Mutter et al., 2009; Mutter et al., 2006; Mutter & Plumlee, 
2009; Mutter et al., 2007; Mutter & Williams, 2004). However, evidence that older adults 
show robust semantic priming effects suggests that they should successfully generalize 
causal value to semantically related absent cues such as category label and related exemplars 
(Burke et al., 1987; Hutchison, Balota, Cortese, & Watson, 2008; Light & Albertson, 1989; 
Myerson et al., 1992). Using the procedure devised by Griffiths and Mitchell (2008), it was 
possible to explore the effects of age on the ability to use similarity to identify the absent cue 
category label from exemplars that resulted either in allergic reaction or no allergic reaction, 
to generate the category label from the exemplars, and to use the category label to generalize 
causal value to new category members. It was expected that if older adults have the same 
deficit in their ability to employ absent cues in a paradigm based on similarity as they do in 
paradigms using contingency and contiguity, they would not be successful in generalizing 
causal value. If, on the other hand, similarity functions like semantic priming to 
automatically activate related knowledge, it was expected that older adults would generate 
the absent cue category label and extend causal value to all exemplars of the category.  
Although older adults may be successful at generalizing causal value, they are 
less likely to show successful exemplar recognition. Griffiths and Mitchell’s (2008) 
young participants showed reduced recognition for exemplars from the categories with 
which they had the most experience in training. Griffiths and Mitchell suggested that the 
more successfully causal value is generalized to the category label, the less likely it is that 
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individual exemplars will be remembered. Results from Verfaellie, Rapcsak, Keane, and 
Alexander (2004) predicted that older adults would perform similarly. They found, in a 
group of normal control participants (mean age 57.6), that the larger the number of 
category exemplars presented, the larger the number of recognition false alarms. Burke et 
al. (1987) found that older adults showed reduced recall for individual exemplars 
subsequent to the category-priming task. In the DRM paradigm, older adults falsely 
remember the non-presented critical lure at the same rate as younger adults, but they 
remember presented cues at a reduced rate (Norman & Schacter, 1997; Tun et al., 1998).  
Given this evidence of older adults’ reduced memory for presented exemplars and 
Myerson et al.’s (1992) findings that older adults show enhanced priming, it seemed 
likely that older adults would show reduced exemplar recognition even for the 
nonrepeated categories 
 
 
 
 16 
CHAPTER 2 
Method 
Design and Participants 
This study received expedited approval by the Western Kentucky University 
Human Subjects Review Board on 21 September 2009 and expedited continuing approval 
on 26 July 2010.The design of the study was a 2 (age group: younger vs. older) X 2 
(pairing: outcome vs. no outcome) X 3 (category presentations: one early vs. one late vs. 
two) X 2 (status of exemplars: old vs. new) mixed factorial. Age was a between subjects 
variable. The pairing with or without outcome, number of category presentations, and old 
or new status of exemplars were within subjects. Causal value judgment and exemplar 
recognition were dependent measures. 
Twenty-four older adults (mean age: 69.13) and 24 younger adults (mean age: 
20.42) were recruited as participants. Using names randomly taken from the Bowling 
Green, Kentucky voter registration rolls or the directory of retired Western Kentucky 
University faculty, letters were sent to recruit prospective older adult participants. 
Persons who indicated interest in participation by calling the Cognition Laboratory were 
screened by telephone. This screening included the Mini Mental State Evaluation 
(MMSE) and a medical history. History of injury, condition, or medication that could 
have impacted cognitive ability or failure to pass the MMSE were reasons for exclusion 
from the study. All older adults who meet the criteria and agree to participate were paid a 
small stipend for their time.  Younger adults were recruited through the established 
Western Kentucky University Psychology Department Study Board. They received 
required class credit or extra credit for their time. History of injury, condition, or  
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medication that could have impacted cognitive ability were reasons for exclusion from 
the study, however, younger adults were not given the MMSE screening.  
Younger and older participants provided demographic information and completed 
a battery of individual difference tasks. Neither group of participants was deliberately 
recruited for equal ethnic, minority, or gender representation, as this was not central to 
the hypothesis of this experiment.  The demographic statistics for the university and 
community indicated that the majority of both groups of participants would be Caucasian. 
Based on these statistics, it was expected that participants of African American descent 
were to constitute approximately 10% of the participant pool and other minorities were to 
represent less than 10% of the volunteers. Reflecting the usual pattern of volunteer 
participation at the university, twice as many young female participants were expected as 
males. Our sample of participants, both from the community and the university, was 
approximately representative of these population expectations. 
Materials 
Previously, ten younger and ten older adults participated in a pilot study to 
determine which food categories and exemplars would be best suited to the population of 
young and older participants in our geographical area. Griffiths and Mitchell’s (2008) 
procedure was used to generate exemplars for these categories. The instructions used 
were those employed by Howard (Battig & Montague, 1969; Howard, 1980). Following 
the protocols used by Griffiths and Mitchell and Howard, ten younger and ten older 
participants were given the category labels alcoholic beverage, fish, fruit, meat, non-
alcoholic beverage, seafood, substance for flavoring food, and vegetable. They were 
asked to generate as many members of the category as possible in 30 seconds. Our young 
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and older participants named similar food category exemplars in similar order.  The 
exemplars produced in the pilot study were then compared with the exemplars used by 
Griffiths and Mitchell and the normed Van Overschelde, Rawson, and Dunlosky (2004) 
lists used by Griffiths and Mitchell in developing their category exemplar lists. From this 
comparison, alcoholic beverages, fruits, meats, non-alcoholic beverages, seafood, and 
vegetables were chosen as the six food categories for the current study. 
An average value was calculated for each pilot exemplar from the six categories 
by weighting the frequency and order with which each was given as a category member. 
The exemplars with the highest average values from these six categories were retained.  
A representative rank was then determined for these exemplars by ordering them 
according to the Van Overschelde et al. (2004) norms. This representative rank was used 
as a proxy for typicality. The same process was followed for the alcoholic beverage, fruit, 
non-alcoholic beverage, and vegetable lists. For categories not included in the Van 
Overschelde lists (meat, seafood), pilot-derived weights were used to determine the 
representative typicality order. This resulted in a list of 20 exemplars, arranged by 
representative typicality (number one, most typical, through number 20, least typical), for 
each category (See Appendix A).  
To achieve approximately equivalent overall typicality levels for exemplars used 
in the training and test phases, sets of exemplars with average representative typicality 
ranks were designated. Each 20-item list of category exemplars was assigned to four sets 
as follows: set one was composed of exemplar numbers 1, 8, 11, 14, and 17; set two was 
composed of exemplar numbers 2, 5, 12, 15, and 18; set three was be composed of 
exemplar numbers 3, 6, 9, 16, and 19 and set four was composed of exemplar number 4, 
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7, 10, 13, and 20 (See Appendix B). The use of these sets was counterbalanced across the 
phases of the experiment (Training Phase 1, Training Phase 2, Causal Judgment Test, and 
Exemplar Recognition) to ensure that each phase contained exemplars of varied 
representative typicality (See Appendix C). 
The six food categories, designated with the letters A+, B-, C+, D-, E+, and F-, 
were assigned to six orders according to the schedule shown in Appendix D. Categories 
were counterbalanced over cue types such that across participants, each category was 
presented as each cue type. The schedule of categories A-F was randomly assigned for 
Order 1. Positions for Orders 2 - 6 were determined by progressing the random 
assignment one category forward for each successive order.  Assigned category 
exemplars were randomly presented for each phase. Exemplars from the food categories 
that assumed the A+, C+, and E+ positions were paired with the sickness outcome and 
those that assumed the B-, D, and F- positions were nonpaired categories that resulted in 
health (See Appendix D).  
The causal learning task consisted of two training phases and two test phases. 
There were five blocks in each training phase and five different foods from each of four 
categories were presented in each block, comprising a total of 20 food exemplars 
presented in each training phase. For example, the A+ category might have been fruits 
and exemplars presented might have been apple, orange, banana, pineapple, and mango. 
The B- category might have been meats and exemplars might have been bacon, hot dog, 
pheasant, pork, and turkey. In Training Phase 1, the participants were presented with 
exemplars from categories A+, B-, C+, and D-. C+ and D- constituted early-presented 
nonrepeated categories. Training Phase 2 included five novel exemplars from repeated 
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categories A+ and B- and five exemplars from categories E+ and F-. E+ and F- 
constituted late-presented nonrepeated categories. A+ and B- constituted repeated 
categories. No individual exemplar was presented more than once during the training 
phases. Causal Judgment ratings comprised the first test phase. Participants were 
presented with ten exemplars from each category.  Five of these were seen during 
training and five were new. The five old exemplars for categories A and B were 
randomly chosen from the 10 exemplars presented over the two training phases. For 
categories C, D, E, and F, the five exemplars seen in training constituted the five old 
exemplars. Exemplar recognition comprised the second test phase. In this phase all 120 
exemplars (20 from each of the six categories) were presented. Participants were asked to 
determine whether or not each exemplar was presented during training. For categories A 
and B, 10 exemplars would have been seen during training. For categories C, D, E, and F, 
five exemplars would have been seen in training. Table 1 shows the skeletal design of the 
experiment. 
Procedure 
All participants, regardless of age, received the same procedure. Each was tested 
individually in the Cognition Laboratory in a single session lasting no longer than three 
hours. A short break was provided approximately halfway through the session. 
Participants were first apprised of the informed consent procedure and asked to carefully 
read and complete the relevant form. A biographical and health information form was 
also completed. This provided data on education, marital and socio-economic status, 
current health, and detailed description of medications. In addition, each participant was 
read the Cognition Laboratory general overview. 
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Table 1 
Design of Study 
Experiment Phase # of trials Categories 
presented 
# of exemplars 
Training    
     Phase 1 20 A+ 5 
  B- 5 
  C+ 5 
    D- 5 
     Phase 2 20 A+ 5 
  B- 5 
  E+ 5 
  F- 5 
 
Test    
     Causal Judgment 60 Old A 5 
  Old B 5 
  Old C 5 
  Old D 5 
  Old E 5 
  Old F 5 
  New A 5 
  New B 5 
  New C 5 
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  New D 5 
  New E 5 
      New F 5 
     Recognition 120 Trained A 10 
  Trained B 10 
  Trained C 5 
  Trained D 5 
  Trained E 5 
  Trained F 5 
  Nontrained A 10 
  Nontrained B 10 
  Nontrained C 15 
  Nontrained D 15 
  Nontrained E 15 
  Nontrained F 15 
 
Participants began the testing session with the causal learning task consisting of 
the two training phases and two test phases. Directions applicable to both training phases 
were presented on the computer screen and read aloud by the experimenter (See 
Appendix E). In each training phase food exemplar names appeared individually on the 
computer screen as written words in size 48 Times New Roman uppercase font. For each 
exemplar the participant made a prediction that the food would result in sickness or 
health when it was eaten by Mr. X. The participant indicated this response by pressing 
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the computer key marked “Sick” (Mr. X will get sick) or “Healthy” (Mr. X will remain 
healthy). Each response was followed by feedback regardless of the accuracy of response. 
“Sick”, written in red ink, followed a response to exemplars from the paired categories  
(A+, C+, E+). “Healthy”, written in green ink, followed a response to exemplars from the 
nonpaired categories (B-, D-, F-). In Training Phase 1, participants made predictions for 
exemplars from the paired categories A+ and C+ resulting in sickness and the nonpaired 
categories B- and D- resulting in health. Training Phase 2 continued in exactly the same 
manner immediately following Training Phase 1. Foods in category A+ were again paired 
with the sickness and those in category B- were nonpaired. Foods from categories C+ and 
D- were replaced in this trial with foods from categories E+ (new “Sick” paired category) 
and F- (new “Healthy” nonpaired category).  
Following the training phases there was a five-minute distraction task during 
which the participants were asked to name countries from different regions of the world 
(Griffiths & Mitchell, 2008). The subsequent test phases included causal judgment 
ratings and a test of exemplar recognition. Instructions for the causal judgment test 
appeared on the computer screen and were read aloud by the experimenter. Five old 
exemplars (seen in training) from each of the six categories as well as five new 
(previously unseen) exemplars from these categories were randomly presented to the 
participant for causal judgment. Because 10 exemplars from categories A+ and B- had 
been presented over the two training phases, five were randomly selected from these 10 
exemplars for causal judgment test. Five new exemplars from these categories were also 
presented for causal judgment. The five exemplars from categories C+, D-, E+, and F- 
presented during training were presented again along with five new exemplars from each 
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of those categories. Thus, a total of 60 exemplars (five old and five new from each 
category) were presented in the causal judgment test. The food names appeared randomly 
one-at-a-time in the same manner as in the training phases. Participants decided, based on 
the two training phases, how likely each presented exemplar was to cause sickness in Mr. 
X. They assigned a numerical value between zero (Mr. X definitely will NOT get sick) 
and 100 (Mr. X definitely WILL get sick) to express the percentage likelihood of the food 
causing sickness in Mr. X and typed in the value using the computer keyboard. There was 
no feedback during this phase of the task.  
In the exemplar recognition phase of the experiment, participants were randomly 
presented with all 120 exemplars (20 from each of the six food categories) and asked to 
decide whether or not Mr. X ate the foods during the two training phases in the first part 
of the experiment. Ten of the 20 examples from categories A and B and five of the 20 
examples from categories C, D, E, and F had been eaten by Mr. X during the training 
phases. Participants indicated their answer by typing in a number between zero (Mr. X 
definitely did NOT eat this food) and 100 (Mr. X definitely ATE this food) 
corresponding to their assessment of whether or not Mr. X ate the food. There was no 
feedback during this phase.  
Following the experimental task all participants completed a series of tests 
assessing cognitive abilities. These tests, the cognitive abilities they measure, the criteria 
for scoring, and the order in which they were administered are listed in Table 2. Results 
from these individual difference measures for the two groups are presented in Table 3. 
Participants were debriefed at the conclusion of the session. 
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Table 2  
Assessments of Individual Difference Abilities in Younger and Older Adults  
Assessment Measure of Cognitive Ability Measures 
Pattern Comparison Processing Speed Total score of correct 
associations 
 
Paired Associates Learning and Memory Total score of correct 
associations 
 
Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test 
Working Memory and 
Executive Function 
Total number of correct 
responses, errors, 
perseverative responses, 
perseverative errors, non-
perseverative errors, 
conceptual level responses 
 
WAIS Digit Symbol Processing Speed Total score of correct 
responses 
 
WAIS Digit Symbol 
Incidental Learning 
Learning and Memory Total score of correct 
responses 
 
FAS-Controlled Oral 
Word Association 
Working Memory and 
Executive Function 
 
Number of words 
Mill Hill Vocabulary Crystallized Verbal 
Knowledge 
Total score of correct 
responses 
 
Conditional Associative 
Learning 
Memory Total score of successful 
responses, retained 
responses, forgotten 
responses, discrimination 
failures, perseverations 
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Table 3 
Comparisons of Age Differences in Individual Difference Measures 
Measure Younger 
M 
Younger 
SD 
Older  
M 
Older  
SD 
F df 
Digit Symbol* 87.46 17.04 56.83 13.28 48.24 46 
Digit Symbol 
Incidental Learning* 
23.88 3.77 19.00 6.05 11.23 46 
Pattern Comparison* 62.46 9.75 43.54 7.58 56.31 46 
Reading Span 3.38 1.84 2.67 1.40 2.25 46 
CAL – Forgotten* 1.33 1.90 3.88 2.71 14.15 46 
CL – Discrimination 
Failure* 
.63 .97 2.75 2.57 14.32 46 
CAL – Perseveration* .29 .75 2.58 2.57 17.59 46 
Mill Hill* 32.13 5.03 39.63 6.93 18.39 46 
WCST – Categories 
Completed* 
3.92 1.32 3.13 1.39 4.10 46 
Paired Associate 
Learning* 
105.67 9.96 87.63 17.72 18.89 46 
!
Note: *p ! .05 
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CHAPTER 3 
Results 
Responses for the last three trials for each category (A+, B-, C+, D-, E+, F-) in the 
two training phases were assessed.  Each of these 24 exemplar judgments was scored as 
correct or incorrect. Participants were excluded from the study if they did not, on average 
(more than 50%), predict sickness for categories A+, C+, and E+ and health for 
categories B-, D-, and F- (Griffiths & Mitchell, 2008). All 24 young participants achieved 
this proficiency level. Two of the 24 older adults failed to reach this level and two new 
participants who met this criterion replaced them.  
All analyses for data collected in this experiment were conducted using an alpha 
level of p ! .05 as the criterion of significance. 
Training 
Young and older participants’ mean predictions for the five blocks in Training 
Phases 1 and 2 are presented in Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5. As can be seen in Figures 2 and 3, 
young and older participants’ Phase 1 predictions were initially very similar for all 
categories. Moreover, across the five blocks, participants in both groups learned to 
predict sickness when presented with exemplars from the categories paired with sickness 
(A+ and C+) and to predict health when presented with exemplars from the nonpaired 
categories (B- and D-). For both groups, the divergence in ratings between the paired and 
nonpaired exemplars began on the second block in Phase 1.    
Young and older participants’ mean predictions from Phase 2 are shown in 
Figures 4 and 5, respectively. Participants in both groups showed divergent ratings  
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for the pretrained categories A and B from the first block. As in Training Phase 1, 
divergence for the untrained categories E and F began in the second trial and continued 
for subsequent trials for both groups.  
!
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!
Figure 3. Older adults’ mean Training Phase 1 predictions.  
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!
!
Figure 4. Young adults’ mean Training Phase 2 predictions.  !!!
!
Figure 5. Older adults’ mean Training Phase 2 predictions.  !
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Causal Judgment 
!
In the causal judgment task, participants rated the likelihood that the food would 
cause sickness. Young and older participants’ mean causal ratings for the new and old 
exemplars from categories trained in Phase 1 and Phase 2 are presented in Figures 6 and 
7, respectively. The ratings for Phase 1 were examined using a 2 (age group) X 2 
(outcome) X 2 (category repetition) X 2 (exemplar status) mixed factorial ANOVA. The 
results of this analysis are shown in Table 5. As can be seen, there were no main or 
interaction effects of age in any of the tests of causal ratings, indicating that older adults’ 
causal learning performance was similar to that of young adults.  However, there were 
significant effects of outcome, status, the interaction of outcome and status, and the three-
way interaction of repetition by outcome by status on these ratings. Overall, participants 
rated the paired categories (A and C) more highly than the unpaired categories (B and D), 
F(1, 46) = 406.34, MSE = 1286.91, p ! .001. The main effect of status of the exemplars 
was significant, F(1, 46) = 3.88, MSE = 150.63, p = .05, but this variable also interacted 
with outcome, F(1,46) = 23.29, MSE = 175.62,    p = .000, suggesting that the difference 
in causal ratings between paired (A and C) and nonpaired (B and D) categories was larger 
for the old exemplars than for new exemplars. 
All of these effects were qualified by the significant three-way interaction of 
repetition, outcome, and status, F(1, 46) = 8.98, MSE = 152.93, p = .004. This interaction 
was examined by analyzing the simple interaction of repetition and status at each level of 
outcome. Repetition did not influence causal ratings if the category was paired with 
sickness (A and C), but if the category was nonpaired (B and D), repetition made a 
difference. For the paired categories (A and C) causal ratings were higher for the trained 
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(old) than the new exemplars regardless of the number of times the category was repeated 
[Repetition, F(1. 47) ! .001 MSE = 711.42, p = .999; Status, F(1, 47) = 21.75, MSE = 
178.55, p ! .001; Repetition X Status, F(1, 47) = .65, MSE = 201.34, p = .425]. For the 
nonpaired categories, the number of times the category was repeated in training affected 
the causal ratings [Repetition, F(1. 47) = 4.03 MSE = 398.43, p = .051; Status, F(1, 47) = 
5.62, MSE = 140.88, p = .022; Repetition X Status, F(1, 47) = 13.03, MSE = 128.91, p = 
.001]. Causal judgment ratings were similar for old and new exemplars from the repeated 
category (B), but for the nonrepeated category (D), old exemplars were given lower 
causal ratings than novel exemplars, F(1, 47) = 13.03, MSE = 128.91, p = .001.  
Table 5 shows causal rating ANOVA results for the Training Phase 2 categories. 
As in Phase 1, there were no age group differences. The main effect of outcome was 
significant, F(1, 46) = 722.23, MSE = 802.31, p ! .001, showing that again in Phase 2 the 
participants rated the paired categories (A and E) more highly than the nonpaired 
categories (B and F). The main effect of status was also significant in Phase 2, F(1, 46) = 
58.15, MSE = 204.23, p = .006, showing that old exemplars seen in training were rated as 
more causal than new exemplars. As in Phase 1, there was a significant interaction of 
outcome and status, F(1, 46) = 24.40, MSE = 127.95, p ! .001, suggesting that the 
difference in the causal ratings between paired (A and E) and nonpaired (B and F) 
categories was larger for the old exemplars than for new exemplars.  There was also a 
three way interaction of repetition, outcome, and status, F(1, 46) = 5.84, MSE = 143.64,  
p = .020 in this training phase. 
The three-way interaction was again investigated by comparing the interaction of 
repetition and status at each level of outcome. This analysis showed that for the paired 
 32 
outcome categories (A and E), only the old or new status of the exemplar was significant, 
[Repetition, F(1. 47) = .03 MSE = 684.45, p = .876; Status, F(1, 47) = 22.90, MSE = 
204.08, p ! .001; Repetition X Status, F(1, 47) = .1.43, MSE = 213.58, p = .238]. For 
these categories causal judgment was higher for the old than the new exemplars 
regardless of the number of times the category was repeated. When the category was 
nonpaired, the number of times the category was presented made a difference in the 
causal judgment, [Repetition, F(1. 47) = 1.84 MSE = 175.54, p = .182; Status, F(1, 47) = 
.92, MSE = 123.27, p = .342; Repetition X Status, F(1, 47) = 10.60, MSE = 52.10, p = 
.002]. For the nonpaired categories, causal judgment was similar for trained and novel 
exemplars from the repeated category (B). For the nonrepeated category (F), the old, 
trained exemplars were given lower causal ratings than novel exemplars, F(1, 47) = 
10.60, MSE = 52.10, p = .002. 
 In summary, both young and older adults appropriately judged causal value for 
category exemplars whether they were old or new. However there were differences in the 
degree of generalization. For both groups, somewhat more generalization occurred for 
exemplars from the nonpaired repeated category (B-) than for the paired repeated 
category (A+) or for the non-repeated categories (C+, D-, E+, or F-) regardless of pairing.  
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!
Figure 6. Young and older adults’ mean causal judgment ratings for Phase 1 
paired (outcome) vs. nonpaired (no outcome) categories. Darker bars represent 
exemplars shown in training. Lighter bars represent novel category exemplars.  !
!
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Exemplar Recognition 
!
Hit and false alarm rates for old and new exemplars in each category in Phase 1 
and Phase 2 were obtained for each participant and were used to calculate d’ scores. The 
mean hit and false alarm rates for the old and new exemplars in each category are shown 
in Table 6, d’ means for exemplar recognition are shown in Table 7, and mean d’ scores 
are shown in Figure 8. A high d’ is an unbiased measure of recognition reflecting correct 
recognition of old exemplars seen in training and correct rejection of novel exemplars not 
seen in training.  
D-prime scores for repeated (A, B) and non-repeated (C, D, E, and F) exemplars 
seen in Phase 1 and 2 were examined using a 2 (age group) X 2 (phase) X 2 (repetition) 
X 2 (outcome) mixed factorial ANOVA. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 
8. There was an overall effect of age on exemplar recognition, F(1, 46) = 5.96,  MSE = 
6.41, p = .019, showing that younger adults discriminated old exemplars form new 
significantly better than older adults. Recognition scores for the repeated categories (A 
and B) were significantly lower than scores for the non-repeated categories (C, D, E, and 
F) resulting in a main effect of repetition, F(1, 46) = 25.22, MSE = 1.77, p !  .001. In 
addition, there was a significant interaction of repetition and age group, F(1, 46) = 97.62, 
MSE = 1.77, p = .008. Analysis of the simple effect of repetition within each group 
showed no group effect for the repeated categories (A and B), F(1, 46) = .75, MSE = 
2.10, p = .391.  However, for the nonrepeated categories (C and D, E and F) older adults 
recognized significantly fewer exemplars than young adults, F(1, 46) = 12.16, MSE = 
2.00, p = .001.  
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Overall, for the repeated categories (A and B), both young and older adults 
showed low veridical exemplar recognition. Older adults showed similarly low 
recognition for exemplars from the nonrepeated categories (C, D, E, and F), whereas 
young adults showed increased memory for these categories. 
!
Figure 8. Young and older participants’ d’ scores for repeated (R) categories A+ 
and B- and non-repeated categories (NR) categories C+, D-, E+, and F-. “+” 
categories paired with sickness outcome and “-“ categories nonpaired. 
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!
Table 4 
ANOVA Results for Training Phase 1 (A, B, C, and D) Causal Judgment Measures 
Effect df MS F p h2 
Repetition 1 803.88 1.41 .24  .03 
Repetition X Group 1 481.51 .84 .36  .02 
Error (Repetition) 46 571.96    
Outcome 1 522917.28 406.34 .00  .90 
Outcome X Group 1 1626.90 1.26 .26  .03 
Error (Outcome) 46 1286.91    
Status 1 584.11 3.88  05  .80 
Status X Group 1 3.38 .02 .88  .00 
Error (Status) 46 150.63    
Repetition X Outcome 1 800.42 1.45 .23  .03 
Repetition X Outcome X Group 1 51.62 .09 .76  .00 
Error (Repetition X Outcome) 46 550.43    
Repetition X Status 1 436.91 2.46 .12  .05 
Repetition X Status X Group 1 182.60 1.03 .31  .02 
Error (Repetition X Status) 46 177.69    
Outcome X Status 1 4089.87 23.29 .00  .34 
Outcome X Status X Group 1 2.34 .01 .90  .00 
Error (Outcome X Status) 46 175.62    
Repetition X Outcome X Status 1 1372.59 8.98 .00  .16 
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Repetition X Outcome X Status X Group 1 130.20 .85 .36  .02 
Error (Repetition X Outcome X Status) 46 152.93    
 
Note: h2 denotes partial eta-squared. 
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Table 5 
 
ANOVA Results for Training Phase 2 (A, B, E, and F) Causal Judgment Measures 
 
Effect df MS F p h2  
Repetition 
 
1        243.21        .52  .47  .01 
Repetition X Group 
 
1        303.88        .65  .36  .01 
Error (Repetition) 46        464.28    
 
Outcome 
 
1 579455.53  722.23  .00  .94 
Outcome X Group 
 
1      1740.81      2.17  .15  .05 
Error (Outcome) 46        802.31 
 
   
Status 
 
1      1665.00      8.15 .01  .15 
Status X Group 
 
1          78.84        .39 .54  .01 
Error (Status) 
 
46        204.23    
Repetition X Outcome 
 
1          96.00        .24 .63  .00 
Repetition X Outcome X Group 
 
1          33.61        .08 .78  .00 
Error (Repetition X Outcome) 
 
46        407.07    
Repetition X Status 
 
1          18.20        .14  .71  .00 
Repetition X Status X Group 
 
1            7.82        .06 .81  .00 
Error (Repetition X Status) 
 
46        126.32    
Outcome X Status 
 
1      3121.32    23.39  .00  .35 
Outcome X Status X Group 
 
1          26.25        .20 .65  .00 
Error (Outcome X Status) 
  
46        127.95    
Repetition X Outcome X Status 
 
1        838.98      5.84 .02  .11 
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Repetition X Outcome X Status X Group 1          61.12        .43 .52  .01 
 
 Error (Repetition X Outcome X Status) 46        143.63    
 
Note: h2 denotes partial eta-squared. 
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Table 6 
 
Mean Hit and False Alarm (FA) Rates for Exemplar Recognition 
 
Category Young  
Hits 
Young  
FA 
Older  
Hits 
Older  
FA 
A .74 .30 .71 .41 
 
B .78 .32 .70 .35 
 
C .86 .17 .72 .29 
 
D .86 .20 .71 .27 
 
E .84 .18 .75 .26 
 
F .79 .17 .72 .24 
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Table 7 
 
Participant d’ Means for Exemplar Recognition 
 
 A  
Phas. 1 
A  
Phas. 2 
B 
Phas. 1 
B 
Phas. 2 
C D E F 
Young 
 
2.15 1.41 2.16 1.53 2.91 3.16 2.86 2.55 
Older 
 
1.48 1.29 2.00 1.50 1.62 1.74 2.08 2.01 
Overall 
 
1.82 1.35 2.06 1.51 2.27 2.45 2.47 2.28 
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Table 8 
 
Omnibus ANOVA Results for d’ Exemplar Recognition Measures 
 
Effect df MS F p h2  
Phase 
 
1     5.81           3.17 .08  .06  
Phase X Group 
 
1     6.71       3.66 .06 .07 
Error (Phase) 
 
46     1.83    
Repetition 
 
1  44.72 25.22 .00 .35 
Repetition X Group 
 
1  13.52 7.63 .01 .14 
Error (Repetition) 46     1.77 
 
   
Outcome 
 
1       .99 .40 .53 .01 
Outcome X Group 
 
1       .68 .28 .60 .01 
Error (Outcome) 
 
46     2.48    
Phase X Repetition 
 
1     6.55 3.60 .06 .07 
Phase X Repetition X Group 
 
1       .69 .38 .54 .01 
Error (Phase X Repetition) 
 
46     1.82    
Phase X Outcome 
 
1     1.22 .57 .46 .01 
Phase X Outcome X Group 
 
1       .00 .00 .99 .00 
Error (Phase X Outcome) 
 
46    2.16    
Repetition X Outcome 
 
1     1.01 .51 .48 .01 
Repetition X Outcome X Group 
 
1       .32 .16 .69 .00 
Error (Repetition X Outcome) 
 
46     1.99    
Phase X Repetition X Outcome X Group 1       .86 .44 .51 .01 
Error (Phase X Repetition X Outcome) 46     1.96    
Note: h2 denotes partial eta-squared. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Discussion 
In this study we used a food categorization task to investigate age-related stimulus 
equivalence generalization differences in causal learning and recognition. In two training 
phases, participants were presented with exemplars from six food categories. 
Specifically, two categories were presented in both training phases providing a repeated 
category, two categories were presented only in the first training phase providing an early 
exposure category, and the two remaining categories were presented only in the second 
training phase providing a late exposure category. Exemplars from half of the categories 
in each training phase were consistently paired with the outcome of sickness in a fictional 
patient.  Exemplars from the other half of the categories were consistently nonpaired with 
sickness and resulted in health for the patient. For each exemplar, participants predicted 
the outcome and then received feedback as to whether or not it caused sickness.  
Although young and older participants were never presented with the food category label, 
they discriminated paired category exemplars from nonpaired category exemplars from 
the second presentation forward. For the categories that were repeated in both training 
phases, clear discrimination was present from the onset of Phase 2. In a subsequent test of 
causal judgment, both young and older adults successfully judged the causal value of 
both trained and new (nontrained) exemplars from the paired and nonpaired categories. A 
later recognition test for exemplars that had been presented in training showed 
differences between the groups. Although young and older adults showed low veridical 
exemplar recognition for repeated categories presented in both training phases, young 
adults recognized significantly more exemplars than older adults for the nonrepeated  
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categories that were seen in only one training phase. Older adults were able to 
successfully judge causal value without the veridical recognition memory for trained 
exemplars regardless of whether the category was repeated or single presentation. Young 
adults, on the other hand, were no different from the older adults for causal judgment or 
recognition from the repeated categories, but they were able to recognize exemplars from 
the single presentation categories. These findings provide evidence for separate cognitive 
abilities. 
Before turning to the theoretical implications, it is important to note that the 
findings from the current study both replicate and extend Griffiths and Mitchell’s (2008) 
results. Our younger and older adults, like Griffiths and Mitchell’s young adults 
generated the absent cue category from trained exemplars and discriminated categories 
that caused sickness from those that did not. They clearly demonstrated the ability to use 
category membership to generalize causal value to new category exemplars, rating 
categories paired with sickness as more causal than nonpaired categories. When category 
exemplars were presented for causal judgment, both of our groups like Griffiths and 
Mitchell’s participants recorded a larger difference in causal ratings between the paired 
and nonpaired category exemplars that were actually seen in training than between the 
corresponding new category exemplars.  
In addition, we observed some findings that Griffiths and Mitchell (2008) did not 
report. We found a difference in causal ratings between the trained and new nonpaired 
category exemplars that did not exist for paired category exemplars. There was no 
difference in the ratings for trained and new exemplars from paired categories regardless 
of the number of times the category was repeated in training. For the categories that were 
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not paired with sickness, the number of times a category was repeated in training made a 
difference in the causal ratings. When the participants had experienced nonpaired food 
categories twice in training, they judged new exemplars from those categories to have 
low causal value. When the participants had experienced a nonpaired food category only 
once in training, they were less certain of the low causal value of the exemplars. 
Our young adults’ exemplar recognition data also replicated Griffiths and 
Mitchell’s (2008) results. Both young groups showed no difference in recognition for the 
paired and nonpaired categories that were repeated in the two training phases. Like 
Griffiths and Mitchell’s, our young adults’ recognition scores for the repeated categories 
were significantly lower than recognition scores for the nonrepeated categories. Our older 
adults’ recognition for the repeated categories was equal to our young adults’. However 
older adults’ recognition for exemplars from the nonrepeated categories was significantly 
lower than that of the young adults.  
Older adults are able to successfully use similarity to generate and mentally 
represent the absent food category from the presented exemplars and then use category 
membership to discriminate paired category exemplars from nonpaired category 
exemplars. The findings from both the prediction discrimination training phase and the 
causal judgment ratings at test are two sources of evidence that older adults, like young 
adults, are able to generate an absent category label from presented exemplars and use the 
generated category label and similarity to generalize causal value to new category 
members. This finding stands in contrast to previous studies showing that older adults 
exhibit deficits in causal learning tasks that require generation of absent cues. That 
research has shown that older adults have difficulty using contingency and contiguity to 
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make successful causal judgments when the cause of an outcome is the absence of a cue 
(e.g., Mutter et al., 2006; Mutter et al., 2009; Mutter & Plumlee, 2009; Mutter & 
Williams, 2004). Additional evidence of older adults’ decreased ability to use absent cues 
in causal judgment is provided by the observed deficit in their ability to retrospectively 
revalue the causal value of absent cues when the paradigm requires associative rather 
than categorical representations. Mutter et al. (in press) found that older adults had 
difficulty in revaluing absent cues when the associative link between cue pairs was either 
formed during training or was already present due to prior experience (e.g. “steak – cake” 
vs. “steak – potato”). In the current study, older adults were clearly able to use categorical 
knowledge to generate the absent cue category and use it to revalue the causal cue 
efficacy of novel cues as successfully as younger adults. 
Both young and older adults showed poor exemplar recognition for the repeated 
categories. This result was expected based on similar findings from prior studies showing 
reduced recognition from categories with which participants have the most experience 
(Griffiths & Mitchell, 2008; Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997; Seamon, Luo, Schlegel, Greene, 
& Goldenberg, 2000; Schacter & Slotnick, 2004; Verfaellie et al., 2004).  In contrast, we 
found age differences for the nonrepeated categories. Young adults seem to show two 
distinct abilities: the ability to generalize causal value to absent cue category exemplars 
and to veridically remember specific exemplars – as long as exposure to the category is 
limited as in the nonrepeated categories. Older adults show the same generalization 
ability, but do not show improved exemplar recognition for nonrepeated-category 
exemplars. Koutstaal and Schacter (1997) suggested that the pronounced tendency of 
older adults to falsely recognize category exemplars from categories from which they had 
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extensive experience was evidence that they relied on general similarities – gist – rather 
than exact exemplar attributes. In this experiment it was possible to use gist to make 
successful causal judgments about an exemplar without remembering exact details about 
that exemplar. However, this was not the case in the recognition test. These findings 
provide evidence of two distinct cognitive processes: knowing and successfully using 
information is distinct from remembering details about that information (Tulving, 1985). 
Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT), a dual-process theory of cognition and memory 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; Brainerd, Reyna, & Howe, 2009) provides a framework for 
understanding the present findings for causal judgment and exemplar recognition 
memory. FTT posits that experiences are processed on a continuum of exactness from 
detailed verbatim to gist. Verbatim, in this context, is a literal representation that captures 
precise surface information whether that information is verbal, numeric, graphic, or any 
other form (Reyna, 2008).  Gist represents a kind of intuition, fuzzy traces, which extract 
and preserve only essential meaning or patterns from experiences. These verbatim and 
fuzzy traces can enter memory as parallel mental representations of the same event. This 
ability for parallel processing allows for cognitive options and flexibility (Brainerd & 
Reyna, 1990). Much evidence supporting FTT has been found using a DRM procedure 
(e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2001; Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002; Tun et al., 1998). In 
this paradigm, gist processing is measured by the false memory of related lures and 
verbatim processing is measured by correct recall or recognition of presented cues.  
Exactly how experiences are processed, encoded, and retrieved is affected by the 
amount of experience, the context, the individual’s knowledge and developmental stage 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2001). Verbatim processing provides the basis for rote learning that 
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is called for under certain circumstances in real life and in most laboratory memory tasks. 
Gist provides the basis for comprehension, concept learning, rational thinking, decision-
making, and, as the results from our study show, causal judgment (Brainerd et al., 2009). 
Even though encoding of verbatim and gist traces may take place in parallel, there is a 
dissociation of verbatim and gist traces during retrieval. Gist traces survive longer than 
verbatim traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 2004). If tested immediately, verbatim information is 
available. If tested after a delay, responses reflect more and more gist retrieval (Brainerd 
& Reyna, 2001; Seamon et al., 2000).  In general, people rely on gist processing when 
possible; gist traces provide more relevant information than verbatim traces, are more 
cognitively available, more malleable, and easier to access (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990).  
 FTT proposes a detailed description of developmental changes. People at all ages 
are capable of both verbatim and gist processing, but consistent findings have shown 
developmental differences in the verbatim/gist ratio. Young children have very low levels 
of false memory implying little gist processing. They appear to literally not “get the gist” 
of related word lists. Throughout childhood and the early adolescent years direct access 
to verbatim traces and reconstruction of gist traces increases, resulting in increased rote 
memory and increased comprehension. Judgment that information is familiar does not 
appear to increase significantly during this period (Brainerd et al., 2009). Young 
adolescents show increased false memory but still demonstrate a level below that of 
young adults (Brainerd et al., 2002). Between young adolescence and young adulthood, 
there appears to be a large increase in the ability to judge familiarity and a small increase 
in direct access, without corresponding change in the reconstruction of gist traces 
(Brainerd et al., 2009). Late adulthood brings a marked decline in direct access to 
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veridical verbatim recollection, a lesser decline in reconstruction, and a stabilization of 
familiarity. The cognitive changes associated with late adulthood are a result of the 
decline in direct access to verbatim traces which results in a net increase of reliance on 
familiarity (Brainerd et al., 2009).  
Output interference is also an assumption of FTT (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990). 
Repeated experience with and responding to stimuli produces noise in the storage and 
retrieval of information that has detrimental effects on memory and results in output 
interference. The more experience a person has with encoding/retrieving information, the 
more a person relies on gist memory (Holiday, Brainerd, & Reyna, 2011; Mutter, 2000: 
Schacter & Slotnick, 2004). Apparently they connect the gist of experience through 
repeated exposure. Repeated testing and recall, as well as longer study lists, force the use 
of reconstruction over direct recall, which activates gist traces over verbatim traces 
(Brainerd et al., 2009). There are also developmental differences in output interference. 
Young children and older adults suffer more from output interference than do young 
adults. This discrepancy contributes to a reduction in older adults’ ability to produce 
verbatim responses (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990). 
Fuzzy trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; Brainerd et al., 2009) provides a 
theoretical foundation for the causal learning and recognition findings from this study. As 
exemplars were presented in training, participants encoded parallel verbatim 
representations for the exemplars and outcomes as well as gist-based category 
representations for the exemplars. They then used the gist-based category representations 
to generalize causal value to new category exemplars.  Both young and older participants 
discriminated the paired categories from the nonpaired categories and successfully 
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generalized causal value to new category members based on these gist-based 
representations. Exemplar recognition results also follow FTT predictions. Exemplar 
recognition for repeated categories was poor for both young and older adults. Output 
interference predicts that verbatim information about exemplars from categories with 
which participants have had extensive experience will be unavailable. Young adults 
showed significantly better ability to use verbatim memory to distinguish nonrepeated-
category trained exemplars from new ones and also generalized causal value to these 
exemplars. This finding suggests that young adults were able to use gist and verbatim 
processing in a relatively flexible manner. They used gist information when the causal 
judgment task demanded it, but retained the ability to use verbatim information for 
memory. Older adults, on the other hand, showed less flexibility. They were able to use 
gist information to successfully generalize causal value but they were not able to use 
verbatim information to successfully distinguish between old and new exemplars. 
However, as FTT predicts, although older adults showed low verbatim processing for the 
categories that were only experienced once in training, they did show a small recency 
boost in memory for exemplars that were seen only in the last training phase.  This 
finding that older adults can use gist to make successful causal judgments extends 
Mutter’s (2000) findings that older adults use gist to make successful judgments 
regarding majority vs. minority group impressions in an illusory correlation paradigm 
even though they had poor verbatim memory for specific group-trait information.  
One important implication from these findings may aid in the understanding of 
how older adults make causal judgments in daily life. Although the idea of a causal 
learning task that uses similarity to judge whether or not a food might cause illness may 
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seem rather removed from real life, in a study that mirrors these laboratory results, 
Carvalho, Block, Sivaramakrishnan, Manchanda, & Mitakakis (2008) found that people 
in real life used cultural similarity to assess perception of their risk to food-borne illness.  
Many older adults need to successfully judge causal value for risks associated with illness 
or medical treatment. FTT, coupled with our findings that older adults may often use gist-
based processing in causal judgment without being able to remember detailed, verbatim 
causal cues, provides evidence that the way information is presented may make a 
difference in decisions as basic as informed consent, drug therapies, or surgery (Reyna, 
2008). 
In summary, the current study provides evidence that older adults are able to use 
similarity as a cue to causality even though they have reduced verbatim memory for these 
cues. FTT proposes that gist processing is actually preferable to verbatim processing and 
leads to successful, rational judgments that take experience, context, and emotion into 
consideration. This global way of processing information may be the quality that is 
traditionally referred to as wisdom.  
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Appendix A 
Category exemplars arranged by production rank typicality. 
Alcoholic Beverage Fruit Meat 
BEER CHICKEN BEEF 
WINE ORANGE BEEF 
VODKA BANANA PORK 
LIQUOR PEAR STEAK 
RUM GRAPE BACON 
WHISKEY PEACH HAM 
MARTINI STRAWBERRY HAMBURGER 
MARGUERITA PINEAPPLE TURKEY 
LJACK DANIELS PLUM LAMB 
TEQUILA MANGO SAUSAGE 
GIN KIWI DEER 
CHAMPAGNE WATERMELON HOT DOG 
DAIQUIRI GRAPEFRUIT BOLOGNA 
SCOTCH LEMIN DUCK 
BOURBON CANTALOUPE MUTTON 
COGNAC TANGERINE GOAT 
BLOODY MARY RASPBERRY PHEASANT 
MOONSHINE BLUEBERRY LIVER 
BRANDY LIME RIBS 
COCKTAIL BLACKBERRY QUAIL 
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Non-alcoholic Beverage Seafood Vegetable 
COKE TROUT CARROT 
SODA SALMON TOMATO 
PEPSI FLOUNDER BROCCOLI 
WATER BASS CELERY 
JUICE CATFISH POTATO 
SPRITE TUNA LETTUCE 
MILK PERCH CORN 
ORANGE JUICE SWORDFISH PEAS 
KOOL-AID HALIBUT GREEN BEANS 
LEMONADE SHRIMP CUCUMBER 
APPLE JUICE LOBSTER ASPARAGUS 
TEA CRAB PEPPERS 
DR. PEPPER SHARK ONION 
FRUIT PUNCH CLAMS SPINACH 
CRANBERRY JUICE MUSSELS SQUASH 
COFFEE SQUID CABBAGE 
GATORADE CALAMARI CAULIFLOWER 
GRAPE JUICE SCALLOPS TURNIP 
HOT CHOCOLATE OYSTERS BEETS 
GINGER ALE SNAPPER RADISH 
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Appendix B 
 
Category exemplar set lists 
 
Alcoholic Beverage Sets (Typicality Number)  
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
BEER (1) WINE (2) VODKA (3) LIQUOR (4) 
MARGUERITA (8)  RUM (5) WHISKEY (6) MARTINI (7) 
GIN (11) CHAMPAGNE (12) JACK DANIELS (9) TEQUILA (10) 
SCOTCH (14) BOURBON (15) COGNAC (16) DAIQUIRI (13) 
BLOODY MARY (17) MOONSHINE (18) BRANDY (19) COCKTAIL (20) 
     
    
Fruit Sets (Typicality Number)   
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
APPLE (1) ORANGE (2) BANANA (3) PEAR (4) 
PINEAPPLE (8) GRAPE (5) PEACH (6) STRAWBERRY (7) 
KIWI (11) WATERMELON (12) PLUM (9) MANGO (10) 
LEMON (14) CANTALOUPE (15) TANGERINE (16) GRAPEFRUIT (13) 
RASPBERRY (17) BLUEBERRY (18) LIME (19) BLACKBERRY (20) 
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Meat Sets (Typicality Number)   
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
CHICKEN (1) BEEF (2) PORK (3) STEAK (4) 
TURKEY (8) BACON (5) HAM (6) HAMBURGER (7) 
DEER (11) HOT DOG (12) LAMB (9) SAUSAGE (10) 
DUCK (14) MUTTON (15) GOAT (16) BOLOGNA (13) 
PHEASANT (17) LIVER (18) RIBS (19) QUAIL (20) 
    
    
Non-alcoholic Beverage Sets (Typicality Number)  
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
COKE (1) SODA (2) PEPSI (3) WATER (4) 
ORANGE JUICE(8) JUICE (5) SPRITE (6) MILK (7) 
APPLE JUICE (11) TEA (12) KOOL-AID (9) LEMONADE (10) 
FRUIT PUNCH(14) CRANBERRY 
JUICE (15) 
COFFEE (16) DR. PEPPER (13) 
GATORADE (17) GRAPE JUICE (18) HOT CHOC. (19) GINGER ALE(20) 
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Seafood Sets (Typicality Number)   
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
TROUT (1) SALMON (2) FLOUNDER (3) BASS (4) 
SWORDFISH (8) CATFISH (5) TUNA (6) PERCH (7) 
LOBSTER (11) CRAB (12) HALIBUT (9) SHRIMP (10) 
CLAMS (14) MUSSELS (15) SQUID (16) SHARK (13) 
CALAMARI (17) SCALLOPS (18) OYSTERS (19) SNAPPER (20) 
    
    
Vegetable Sets (Typicality Number)   
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
CARROT (1) TOMATO (2) BROCCOLI (3) CELERY (4) 
PEAS (8) POTATO (5) LETTUCE (6) CORN (7) 
ASPARAGUS (11) PEPPERS (12) GREEN BEANS 
(9) 
CUCUMBER (10) 
SPINACH (14) SQUASH (15) CABBAGE (16) ONION (13) 
CAULIFLOWER (17) TURNIP (18) BEETS (19) RADISH (20) 
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Appendix C 
Schedule of sets 
 Training 1 Training 2 Causal Judgment Recognition 
Order 1 Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
Order 2 Set 4 Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 
Order 3 Set 3 Set 4 Set 1 Set 2 
Order 4 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 1 
Order 5 Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
Order 6 Set 4 Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 
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Appendix D 
 
Schedule of category assignment to orders 1-6 
 
 
Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 
A+ Al Bev Fruit Meat Non-al Bev Seafood Vegetable 
B- Meat Non-al Bev Seafood Vegetable Al Bev Fruit 
C+ Vegetable Al Bev Fruit Meat Non-al Bev Seafood 
D- Fruit Meat Non-al Bev Seafood Vegetable Al Bev 
E+ Non-al Bev Seafood Vegetable Al Bev Fruit Meat 
F- Seafood Vegetable Al Bev Fruit Meat Non-al Bev 
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Orders of exemplar presentation 
 
Order 1 
 
A+ Alcoholic Beverage  D- Fruit 
B- Meat   E+ Non-alcoholic Beverage 
C+ Vegetable   F- Seafood 
Training Phase 1 
 
A+ B- C+ D- 
BEER CHICKEN CARROT  APPLE 
MARGUERITA TURKEY  PEAS PINEAPPLE 
GIN DEER ASPARAGUS KIWI 
SCOTCH DUCK SPINACH LEMON 
BLOODY MARY PHEASANT CAULIFLOWER RASPBERRY 
 
Training Phase 2         
A+ B- E+ F- 
WINE BEEF SODA SALMON 
RUM  BACON  JUICE CATFISH 
CHAMPAGNE HOT DOG TEA CRAB 
BOURBON MUTTON CRANBERRY 
JUICE 
MUSSELS 
MOONSHINE LIVER GRAPE JUICE SCALLOPS 
 
Causal Judgment Test 
A+ B- C+ 
MARGUERITA TURKEY  CARROT 
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SCOTCH DUCK PEAS 
BLOODY MARY PHEASANT ASPARAGUS 
CHAMPAGNE  HOT DOG SPINACH 
BOURBON MUTTON CAULIFLOWER 
VODKA PORK BROCCOLI 
WHISKEY HAM LETTUCE 
JACK DANIELS LAMB GREEN BEANS 
COGNAC GOAT CABBAGE 
BRANDY RIBS BEETS 
  
D- E+ F- 
APPLE SODA SALMON 
PINEAPPLE JUICE CATFISH 
KIWI  TEA CRAB 
LEMON CRANBERRY JUICE MUSSELS 
RASPBERRY GRAPE JUICE SCALLOPS 
BANANA PEPSI FLOUNDER 
PEACH SPRITE TUNA 
PLUM KOOL-AID HALIBUT 
TANGERINE COFFEE SQUID 
LIME  HOT CHOCOLATE  OYSTER 
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Order 2 
 
A+ Fruit   D- Meat 
B- Non-alcoholic Beverage  E+ Seafood 
C+ Alcoholic Beverage                  F- Vegetable    
Training Phase 1 
 
A+ B- C+ D- 
PEAR  WATER LIQUOR STEAK 
STRAWBERRY MILK MARTINI HAMBURGER 
MANGO LEMONADE TEQUILA SAUSAGE 
GRAPEFRUIT DR. PEPPER DAIQUIRI BOLOGNA 
BLACKBERRY GINGER ALE COCKTAIL QUAIL 
 
Training Phase 2 
 
A+ B- E+ F- 
APPLE COKE TROUT CARROT  
PINEAPPLE ORANGE JUICE SWORDFISH PEAS 
KIWI APPLE JUICE LOBSTER ASPARAGUS 
LEMON FRUIT PUNCH CLAMS SPINACH 
RASPBERRY GATORADE CALAMARI CAULIFLOWER 
 
Causal Judgment Test 
A+ B- C+  
STRAWBERRY  MILK LIQUOR 
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GRAPEFRUIT  DR. PEPPER MARTINI 
BLACKBERRY GINGER ALE TEQUILA 
KIWI APPLE JUICE DAIQUIRI 
LEMON FRUIT PUNCH COCKTAIL 
ORANGE SODA WINE 
GRAPE JUICE RUM 
WATERMELON TEA CHAMPAGNE 
CANTALOUPE CRANBERRY JUICE BOURBON 
BLUEBERRY GRAPE JUICE MOONSHINE 
 
D- E+ F- 
STEAK TROUT CARROT  
HAMBURGER SWORDFISH PEAS 
SAUSAGE LOBSTER ASPARAGUS 
BOLOGNA CLAMS SPINACH 
QUAIL CALAMARI CAULIFLOWER 
BEEF SALMON TOMATO 
BACON  CATFISH POTATO 
HOT DOG CRAB PEPPERS 
MUTTON MUSSELS SQUASH 
LIVER SCALLOPS TURNIP 
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Order 3 
 
A+ Meat  D- Non-alcoholic Beverage 
B- Seafood  E+ Vegetable 
C+ Fruit  F- Alcoholic Beverage 
     
Training Phase 1 
A+ B- C+ D- 
PORK FLOUNDER BANANA PEPSI 
HAM TUNA PEACH SPRITE 
LAMB HALIBUT PLUM KOOL-AID 
GOAT SQUID TANGERINE COFFEE 
RIBS OYSTERS LIME HOT 
CHOCOLATE 
 
Training Phase 2 
A+ B- E+ F- 
STEAK BASS CELERY LIQUOR 
HAMBURGER PERCH CORN MARTINI 
SAUSAGE SHRIMP CUCUMBER TEQUILA 
BOLOGNA SHARK ONION DAIQUIRI 
QUAIL SNAPPER RADISH COCKTAIL 
  
 
Causal Judgment Test 
A+ B- C+ 
HAM TUNA BANANA 
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GOAT SQUID PEACH 
RIBS OYSTERS PLUM 
SAUSAGE SHRIMP TANGERINE 
BOLOGNA SHARK LIME 
CHICKEN TROUT APPLE 
TURKEY  SWORDFISH PINEAPPLE 
DEER LOBSTER KIWI 
DUCK CLAMS LEMON 
PHEASANT CALAMARI RASPBERRY 
 
D- E+ F- 
PEPSI  CELERY LIQUOR 
SPRITE CORN MARTINI 
KOOL-AID CUCUMBER TEQUILA 
COFFEE ONION DAIQUIRI 
HOT CHOCOLATE RADISH COCKTAIL 
COKE CARROT  BEER 
ORANGE JUICE PEAS MARGUERITA 
APPLE JUICE ASPARAGUS GIN 
FRUIT PUNCH SPINACH SCOTCH 
GATORADE CAULIFLOWER BLOODY MARY 
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Order 4 
 
A+ Non-alcoholic Beverage D- Seafood 
B- Vegetable   E+ Alcoholic Beverage 
C+ Meat   F- Fruit     
Training Phase 1 
A+ B- C+ D- 
SODA TOMATO BEEF SALMON 
JUICE POTATO BACON  CATFISH 
TEA PEPPERS HOT DOG CRAB 
CRANBERRY 
JUICE 
SQUASH MUTTON MUSSELS 
GRAPE JUICE TURNIP LIVER SCALLOPS 
 
Training Phase 2 
A+ B- E+ F- 
PEPSI BROCCOLI VODKA BANANA 
SPRITE LETTUCE WHISKEY PEACH 
KOOL-AID GREEN BEANS JACK DANIELS PLUM 
COFFEE CABBAGE COGNAC TANGERINE 
HOT 
CHOCOLATE 
BEETS BRANDY LIME 
  
Causal Judgment Test 
A+ B- C- 
JUICE POTATO BEEF 
CRANBERRY JUICE SQUASH BACON 
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GRAPE JUICE TURNIP HOT DOG 
KOOL-AID GREEN BEANS MUTTON 
COFFEE CABBAGE LIVER 
WATER CELERY STEAK 
MILK CORN HAMBURGER 
LEMONADE CUCUMBER SAUSAGE 
DR. PEPPER ONION BOLOGNA 
GINGER ALE RADISH QUAIL 
 
D- E+ F- 
SALMON VODKA BANANA 
CATFISH WHISKEY PEACH 
CRAB JACK DANIELS PLUM 
MUSSELS COGNAC TANGERINE 
SCALOPS BRANDY LIME 
BASS LIQUOR PEAR  
PERCH MARTINI STRAWBERRY 
SHRIMP TEQUILA MANGO 
SHARK DAIQUIRI GRAPEFRUIT 
SNAPPER COCKTAIL BLACKBERRY 
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Order 5 
 
A+ Seafood   D- Vegetable 
B- Alcoholic Beverage  E+ Fruit 
C+ Non-alcoholic Beverage F- Meat 
     
Training Phase 1 
A+ B- C+ D- 
TROUT BEER COKE CARROT  
SWORDFISH MARGUERITA ORANGE JUICE PEAS 
LOBSTER GIN APPLE JUICE ASPARAGUS 
CLAMS SCOTCH FRUIT PUNCH SPINACH 
CALAMARI BLOODY MARY GATORADE CAULIFLOWER 
 
Training Phase 2 
A+ B- E+ F- 
SALMON WINE ORANGE BEEF 
CATFISH RUM GRAPE BACON  
CRAB CHAMPAGNE WATERMELON HOT DOG 
MUSSELS BOURBON CANTALOUPE MUTTON 
SCALLOPS MOONSHINE BLUEBERRY LIVER 
 
Causal Judgment Test 
 
A+ B- C+ 
SWORDFISH MARGUERITA COKE 
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CLAMS SCOTCH ORANGE JUICE 
CALAMARI BLOODY MARY APPLE JUICE 
CRAB CHAMPAGNE FRUIT PUNCH 
MUSSELS BOURBON GATORADE 
FLOUNDER VODKA PEPSI 
TUNA WHISKEY SPRITE 
HALIBUT JACK DANIELS KOOL-AID 
SQUID COGNAC COFFEE 
OYSTERS BRANDY HOT CHOCOLATE  
 
D- E+ F- 
CARROT ORANGE BEEF 
PEAS  GRAPE BACON 
ASPARAGUS WATERMELON HOT DOG 
SPINACH CANTALOUPE MUTTON 
CAULIFLOWER BLUEBERRY LIVER 
BROCCOLI BANANA PORK 
LETTUCE PEACH HAM 
GREEN BEANS PLUM LAMB 
CABBAGE TANGERINE GOAT 
BEETS LIME RIBS 
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Order 6 
 
A+ Vegetable   D- Alcoholic Beverage 
B- Fruit   E+ Meat 
C+ Seafood   F- Non-alcoholic Beverage  
Training Phase 1 
A+ B- C+ D- 
CELERY PEAR  BASS LIQUOR 
CORN STRAWBERRY PERCH MARTINI 
CUCUMBER MANGO SHRIMP TEQUILA 
ONION GRAPEFRUIT SHARK DAIQUIRI 
RADISH BLACKBERRY SNAPPER COCKTAIL 
 
Training Phase 2 
 
A+ B- E+ F- 
CARROT  APPLE CHICKEN COKE 
PEAS PINEAPPLE TURKEY  ORANGE JUICE 
ASPARAGUS KIWI DEER APPLE JUICE 
SPINACH LEMON DUCK FRUIT PUNCH 
CAULIFLOWER RASPBERRY PHEASANT GATORADE 
 
Causal Judgment Test 
 
A+ B- C+ 
CORN STRAWBERRY BASS 
ONION GRAPEFRUIT PERCH 
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RADISH BLACKBERRY SHRIMP 
ASPARAGUS KIWI SHARK 
SPINACH LEMON SNAPPER 
TOMATO ORANGE SALMON 
POTATO GRAPE CATFISH 
PEPPERS WATERMELON CRAB 
SQUASH CANTALOUPE MUSSELS 
TURNIP BLUEBERRY SCALLOPS 
 
 
D- E+ F- 
LIQUOR CHICKEN COKE 
MARTINI TURKEY ORANGE JUICE 
TEQUILA DEER APPLE JUICE 
DAIQUIRI DUCK FRUIT PUNCH 
COCKTAIL PHEASANT  GATORADE 
WINE BEEF SODA 
RUM BACON  JUICE 
CHAMPAGNE HOT DOG TEA 
BOURBON MUTTON CRANBERRY JUICE 
MOONSHINE LIVER GRAPE JUICE 
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Appendix E 
Participant instructions 
Training Phase Instructions 
In the following experiment you are to imagine that you are an allergist, someone 
who tries to discover the cause of allergic reactions in people. You have just been 
presented with a new patient, Mr. X, who suffers from allergic reactions following some 
meals, but not others. In an attempt to discover which foods cause Mr. X to have allergic 
reactions, you arrange for him to eat various foods for a meal on each day, and observe 
whether he has an allergic reaction. 
 
The computer will display to you the food he has for each meal. After each 
presentation, please predict whether Mr. X will have an allergic reaction after this meal 
or not. To do this, press the key marked “Y” to indicate that the food WILL make Mr. X 
sick or press the key marked “N” to indicate that the food will NOT make Mr. X sick. The 
computer will then tell you if an allergic reaction occurred. 
 
Speed of response is not important, so take as much time as you need before 
responding. Obviously, at first you will have to guess, as you don’t know anything abut 
your patient, but hopefully as you continue to be presented with meals, you will begin to 
learn which foods cause allergic reactions. 
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Test Phase 1 – Causal Judgment Task Instructions 
You will now be presented some foods. Mr. X may or may not have eaten these 
foods earlier. You job is to assess whether these foods will make Mr. X sick. For each 
food, please rate whether you think Mr. X will get sick or not. To do this, type in the 
number between 0 and 100 (0 = Mr. X definitely will NOT get sick. 100 = Mr. X 
definitely WILL get sick.) that corresponds to the likelihood of the food making Mr. X 
sick. 
  
Test Phase 2 – Exemplar Recognition Task Instructions 
You will now be presented with a series of foods. Mr. X may or may not have 
eaten these foods in the first part of the experiment. Your task is to state whether or not 
you remember these foods from the very first part of the experiment. To do this, please 
type in the number between 0 and 100 (0 = Mr. X definitely did NOT eat the food. 100 = 
Mr. X definitely did EAT the food.) that corresponds to your memory for the food. 
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Appendix F 
 
WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY 
Human Subjects Review Board 
Office of Sponsored Programs 
301 Potter Hall 
270-745-4652; Fax 270-745-4211 
E-mail:  Paul.Mooney@wku.edu 
 
In future correspondence, please refer to HS10-038, September 21, 2009 
 
Melanie W. Asriel 
c/o Dr. Sharon Muter 
Psychology 
WKU 
  
Melanie W. Asriel: 
 
Your research project, Aging and Generalization of Causal Value, was reviewed by the HSRB and it has 
been determined that risks to subjects are:  (1) minimized and reasonable; and that (2) research procedures 
are consistent with a sound research design and do not expose the subjects to unnecessary risk.  Reviewers 
determined that:  (1) benefits to subjects are considered along with the importance of the topic and that 
outcomes are reasonable; (2) selection of subjects is equitable; and (3) the purposes of the research and the 
research setting is amenable to subjects’ welfare and producing desired outcomes; that indications of 
coercion or prejudice are absent, and that participation is clearly voluntary. 
 
1.   In addition, the IRB found that you need to orient participants as follows: (1) signed informed consent 
is required; (2) Provision is made for collecting, using and storing data in a manner that protects the 
safety and privacy of the subjects and the confidentiality of the data. (3) Appropriate safeguards are 
included to protect the rights and welfare of the subjects. 
 
This project is therefore approved at the Expedited Review Level until September 21, 2010. 
 
2. Please note that the institution is not responsible for any actions regarding this protocol before 
approval.  If you expand the project at a later date to use other instruments please re-apply.  Copies of 
your request for human subjects review, your application, and this approval, are maintained in the 
Office of Sponsored Programs at the above address. Please report any changes to this approved 
protocol to this office.  A Continuing Review protocol will be sent to you in the future to determine the 
status of the project. Also, please use the stamped approval forms to assure participants of compliance 
with The Office of Human Research Protections regulations. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Paul J. Mooney, M.S.T.M. 
Compliance Coordinator 
Office of Sponsored Programs 
Western Kentucky University 
 
 
cc:  HS file number Asriel HS10-038 
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Appendix G 
INFORMED CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT/STUDY 
 
 
Project Title:  Age Differences in Judgment and Decision Making 
1.  I, __________________________________________, agree to participate in a research project conducted by 
scientists at Western Kentucky University.  I understand that the project involves research and that the purpose of 
the research is to study how the processes of learning and judgment vary across the life span. 
2.  I understand that the procedures to be followed are:  I will first complete questionnaires concerning my 
background (e.g., age, education, and income) and general health.  I will then be administered several tasks designed 
to assess my learning ability and perform related mental operations.  I understand that these tasks will be simple and 
well within my ability to complete.  I will also be given tasks that measure cognitive abilities such as my vocabulary 
and extent of my general knowledge.  All of these tasks will be drawn from standard psychological test batteries and 
from published psychological studies. 
I understand that these tasks and questionnaires will be administered to me in the Cognition Laboratory at Western 
Kentucky University. 
3.  I understand that I may decline to answer specific questions in any of the questionnaires administered in this 
study if I so choose and that by completing these questionnaires I give my consent for use of these data by the 
researchers. 
4.  I understand that the tasks and questionnaires that will be administered in this study are experimental in nature.  
They may not be related to my ability to carry out normal daily activities or job-related duties. 
5.  I understand that my scores will be combined with those of other participants to obtain group scores and that 
information on group performance will be available to me, if I so desire, in written reports of the results of this 
research. 
6. I understand that the information collected in this study will only be used in ways that will not reveal who I am. 
Any personal information that could identify me will be removed or changed before files are shared with other 
researchers or results are made public. I also understand that Federal or state laws may require the researchers to 
show information to university or government officials [or sponsors], who are responsible for monitoring the safety 
of this study.  
7.  I understand that the only foreseeable risks or discomforts to me as a result of participation in this study may be a 
feeling of boredom during the procedure or a feeling of not doing well.  I understand that there is nothing unusual 
about these feelings and that I may discuss any perceptions and feelings that I have about the research with the 
interviewer if I so desire. 
8.  I understand that the benefits to me or to others, which may be reasonably expected from the research, are: a 
chance to contribute to the understanding of how important psychological processes change with age. 
9.  I understand that I will receive course credit or extra credit and if applicable, monetary compensation for my 
participation.  I further understand that the primary costs I will incur as a result of participating in this research are in 
time spent with the interviewer -- approximately one to four hours are required to complete all tasks. 
10.  I understand that my participation in this research study is voluntary, that my refusal to participate will involve 
no penalty or loss of benefits to which I might be otherwise be entitled and that I may discontinue my participation 
at any time without penalty or loss of credits already obtained. 
11.  I understand that my current class standing and grade will not be affected by my decision to withdraw from this 
S   
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research study. 
12.  I understand that there are no anticipated circumstances under which my participation may be terminated by the 
investigator without regard to my consent. 
13.  I understand that significant new findings developed during the course of this research but prior to my own 
participation, and which may relate to my willingness to continue participation, will be provided to me prior to my 
beginning the task. 
14.  I have had an opportunity to ask ____________________________ questions about the research project.  I 
understand that I may contact Dr. Sharon Mutter, Department of Psychology, (270) 745-4389 for additional 
information about this research and for any questions I might have concerning the conduct of this study. 
15.  I have received a signed copy of this consent form. 
Signature of Participant   
Witness   
Date and Time   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE DATED APPROVAL ON THIS CONSENT FORM INDICATES THAT 
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY 
THE WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD 
Paul Mooney, Human Protections Administrator 
TELEPHONE:  (270) 745-4652
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INFORMED CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT/STUDY 
 
 
Project Title: Age Differences in Judgment and Decision Making 
1.  I, _____________________________________, agree to participate in a research project conducted by scientists 
at Western Kentucky University.  I understand that the project involves research and that the purpose of the research 
is to study how the processes of learning and judgment vary across the life span. 
2.  I understand that the procedures to be followed are:  I will first complete questionnaires concerning my 
background (e.g., age, education, and income) and general health.  I will then be administered several tasks designed 
to assess my learning ability and perform related mental operations.  I understand that these tasks will be simple and 
well within my ability to complete.  I will also be given tasks that measure cognitive abilities such as my vocabulary 
and the extent of my general knowledge.  All of these tasks will be drawn from standard psychological test batteries 
and from published psychological studies. 
I understand that these tasks and questionnaires will be administered to me in the Cognition Laboratory at Western 
Kentucky University. 
3.  I understand that I may decline to answer specific questions in any of the questionnaires administered in this 
study if I so choose and that by completing these questionnaires I give my consent for use of these data by the 
researchers. 
4.  I understand that the tasks and questionnaires that will be administered in this study are experimental in nature.  
They are not related to my ability to carry out normal daily activities or job-related duties. 
5.  I understand that my scores will be combined with those of other participants to obtain group scores and that 
information on group performance will be available to me, if I so desire, in written reports of the results of this 
research. 
6. I understand that the information collected in this study will only be used in ways that will not reveal who I am. 
Any personal information that could identify me will be removed or changed before files are shared with other 
researchers or results are made public. I also understand that Federal or state laws may require the researchers to 
show information to university or government officials [or sponsors], who are responsible for monitoring the safety 
of this study.  
7.  I understand that the only foreseeable risks or discomforts to me as a result of participation in this study may be a 
feeling of boredom during the procedure or a feeling of not doing well.  I understand that there is nothing unusual 
about these feelings and that I may discuss any perceptions and feelings that I have about the research with the 
interviewer if I so desire. 
8.  I understand that the benefits to me or to others, which may be reasonably expected from the research, are: a 
chance to contribute to the understanding of how important psychological processes change with age. 
9.  I understand that I will receive monetary compensation for my participation.  I further understand that the 
primary costs I will incur as a result of participating in this research are in time spent with the interviewer -- 
approximately one to four hours are required to complete all tasks. 
10.  I understand that my participation in this research study is voluntary, that my refusal to participate will involve 
no penalty or loss of benefits to which I might be otherwise be entitled and that I may discontinue my participation 
at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which I am otherwise entitled. 
11.  I understand that the consequences of my decision to withdraw from the research study and the procedures for 
orderly termination of my participation are: none. 
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12.  I understand that the anticipated circumstances under which my participation may be terminated by the 
investigator without regard to my consent are: none. 
13.  I understand that significant new findings developed during the course of this research, which may relate to my 
willingness to continue participation, will be provided to me. 
14.  I have had an opportunity to ask ____________________________ questions about the research project.  I 
understand that I may contact Dr. Sharon Mutter, Department of Psychology, (270) 745-4389, for additional 
information about this research and for any questions I might have concerning the conduct of this study. 
15.  I have received a signed copy of this consent form. 
 
Signature of Participant   
Witness   
Date and Time   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE DATED APPROVAL ON THIS CONSENT FORM INDICATES THAT 
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY 
THE WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD 
Paul Mooney, Human Protections Administrator 
TELEPHONE:  (270) 745-4652 
!
